Britain gave an elite group of engineers sweeping power and massive resources to deliver a nuclear power revolution. But their nuclear dreams crumbled.
Great work Alex, I did not know that UK civil nuclear programme was so pioneering right next to the US. Still the graph with the buildout by year should perhaps show installed capacity rather than the number (in the latter case, the US is much more dominant).
I am not sure what learning I should draw from the AGR, and perhaps that is the tragedy of life (and UK nuclear programme). Nothing much has happened, and still the result, 50-60 years later, is disastrous... It seems that there was nothing wrong with AGR except for the failed tender for the first reactor and mishandled communication, neither of which should be too grave to destroy one whole industry. I am struggling to understand why exactly AGR was a "bad technology choice"? After all, as the author wrote, with time the suppliers learned to build it almost in budget and on a reasonable timeline, so the initial implementation problems were resolved. Or is there something missing?
Also, do we know the CAPEX (in 2025 GBP/kW) of AGR and magnox reactors?
The AGRs weren't bad per se, but construction time was too long and the availability was too low for too long.
On top of that, AGR reactor blocks are smaller than the LWR competition, sharing the personnel cost over fewer Megawatthours.
Their greatest disadvantage though is the aging of the graphite, which can't be realistically switched out. Therefore, AGRs can't undergo the lifetime extensions to 80 years like PWRs and BWRs and will shut down over the next years. And keeping them in operation right now already requires some effort.
In addition, the AGRs are gas cooled reactors in a world that standardized on LWRs, which means they aren't supported by a global industrial base.
Fascinating history. Having worked on the AGR fleet the numerous small differences between the plants is very frustrating but you have to balance improvements as you learn from each build with the value of consistency, we shall see how well that gets done with SZC. I'm also glad we're no longer allowing radioactive waste to be dropped in the sea. For those interested in how large infrastructure projects could be done: How Big Things Get Done, by Flyvbjerg and Gardner is a great read
I wonder if there is something even more profound lying underneath this, since the story of early technical success, and developing a global lead is very similar to the story of the aircraft carrier. The subsequent failure to turn that early lead into success (military in that case) is echoed here. Ideas?
That was a great and very thorough article. Very well done.
Britain’s early nuclear programme was primarily driven by military plutonium production, a legacy they are still dealing with in the continuing (and slow) decommissioning of the Windscale Piles at Sellafield. This led the British to develop their expertise in graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactors and eventually (alongside the industrial and political factors you mention) to the later AGR programme.
AGRs were not sufficiently standardised between stations and remained largely unique to Britain, limiting international supply-chain support and shared R&D.
In terms of the current state of the industry and the issue with Hinkley point C, perhaps decades of inconsistent new-build policy have also created workforce and intergenerational knowledge-transfer problems that continue to affect the industry, which could also explain the delay and overspend.
Excellent research. There is always a tradeoff between "this is good to do" and just bad policy that citizens have few means to change. Your nuclear casestudies are a mix of these contentions. hat is to argue for good engineering, as long as the philosophy is good. And there are always jokers from the rest of the economy, We just operate in a complex ecology.
The narrative suggests that nuclear power was the only public policy issue which changed when public opinion polls said the voters disagreed with it. I cannot think of any other case. As with Brexit the state usually does what it intended in the first place.
What this litany of failure shows us is the unaccountable incompetence of the state. Amazingly the media reaction to any such disaster is to call for yet more state control.
Great work Alex, I did not know that UK civil nuclear programme was so pioneering right next to the US. Still the graph with the buildout by year should perhaps show installed capacity rather than the number (in the latter case, the US is much more dominant).
I am not sure what learning I should draw from the AGR, and perhaps that is the tragedy of life (and UK nuclear programme). Nothing much has happened, and still the result, 50-60 years later, is disastrous... It seems that there was nothing wrong with AGR except for the failed tender for the first reactor and mishandled communication, neither of which should be too grave to destroy one whole industry. I am struggling to understand why exactly AGR was a "bad technology choice"? After all, as the author wrote, with time the suppliers learned to build it almost in budget and on a reasonable timeline, so the initial implementation problems were resolved. Or is there something missing?
Also, do we know the CAPEX (in 2025 GBP/kW) of AGR and magnox reactors?
The AGRs weren't bad per se, but construction time was too long and the availability was too low for too long.
On top of that, AGR reactor blocks are smaller than the LWR competition, sharing the personnel cost over fewer Megawatthours.
Their greatest disadvantage though is the aging of the graphite, which can't be realistically switched out. Therefore, AGRs can't undergo the lifetime extensions to 80 years like PWRs and BWRs and will shut down over the next years. And keeping them in operation right now already requires some effort.
In addition, the AGRs are gas cooled reactors in a world that standardized on LWRs, which means they aren't supported by a global industrial base.
Let’s hope the new taskforce reads this insightful article!
Fascinating history. Having worked on the AGR fleet the numerous small differences between the plants is very frustrating but you have to balance improvements as you learn from each build with the value of consistency, we shall see how well that gets done with SZC. I'm also glad we're no longer allowing radioactive waste to be dropped in the sea. For those interested in how large infrastructure projects could be done: How Big Things Get Done, by Flyvbjerg and Gardner is a great read
I wonder if there is something even more profound lying underneath this, since the story of early technical success, and developing a global lead is very similar to the story of the aircraft carrier. The subsequent failure to turn that early lead into success (military in that case) is echoed here. Ideas?
Not to mention every other British industry, as it would seem (cf James Hamilton-Paterson, 'What We Have Lost: The Dismantling of Great Britain,' https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/dec/24/what-we-have-lost-by-james-hamilton-paterson-the-dismantling-of-great-britain).
That was a great and very thorough article. Very well done.
Britain’s early nuclear programme was primarily driven by military plutonium production, a legacy they are still dealing with in the continuing (and slow) decommissioning of the Windscale Piles at Sellafield. This led the British to develop their expertise in graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reactors and eventually (alongside the industrial and political factors you mention) to the later AGR programme.
AGRs were not sufficiently standardised between stations and remained largely unique to Britain, limiting international supply-chain support and shared R&D.
In terms of the current state of the industry and the issue with Hinkley point C, perhaps decades of inconsistent new-build policy have also created workforce and intergenerational knowledge-transfer problems that continue to affect the industry, which could also explain the delay and overspend.
Great article.
One comment:
"between theoretical maximum AGR output and the actual number of megawatts generated."
Should be Megawatthours or another unit of energy here.
Yet, Great Britain launched her first nuclear submarine on Trafalgar Day 1960 and has since launched an additional 32.
Excellent research. There is always a tradeoff between "this is good to do" and just bad policy that citizens have few means to change. Your nuclear casestudies are a mix of these contentions. hat is to argue for good engineering, as long as the philosophy is good. And there are always jokers from the rest of the economy, We just operate in a complex ecology.
The narrative suggests that nuclear power was the only public policy issue which changed when public opinion polls said the voters disagreed with it. I cannot think of any other case. As with Brexit the state usually does what it intended in the first place.
What this litany of failure shows us is the unaccountable incompetence of the state. Amazingly the media reaction to any such disaster is to call for yet more state control.